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By ROBERT J. GORDON *
It is now 25 years since the growth rate of labor productivity and of multi-factor productivity (MFP) decelerated sharply both in the United States and in most other industrialized nations. This "productivity slowdown" has eluded many attempts to provide single-cause explanations. Slow productivity growth in the past 25 years echoes slow productivity growth in the late 19th century. Perhaps both were normal, and what needs to be explained is not the post-1972 slowdown, but rather the post-1913 "speedup" that ushered in the glorious 60 years between World War I and the early 1970's in which U.S. productivity growth was much faster than before or after.
This paper makes a sharp distinction between MFP growth calculated from inputs that combine simple measures of labor hours and the capital stock and growth based on measures that adjust for the changing composition of labor and capital. The first step toward an understanding of long-term trends is to compare like with like, splicing MFP data based on unadjusted inputs prior to 1950 with post-1950 data based also on unadjusted inputs, as contrasted to the composition-adjusted inputs that are now desirably incorporated into our official MFP measures.
The MFP record prior to 1929 still rests largely on the monumental work of John Kendrick (1961) which, however, is based almost entirely on input quantities that lack any adjustment for changes in composition. Edward Denison (1962 Denison ( , 1985 and Zvi Griliches (1960) The point of departure is the "standard" history of MFP growth since 1870 based on unadjusted inputs, linking Kendrick (1961) and BEA data to post-1948 BLS data "stripped" of the usual composition adjustments. Column (ii) in Table 1 displays 
IL Composition Adjustments for Labor Input
The BLS composition adjustments in column (iv) of Table 2 
III. Composition and Quantity Adjustments for Capital Input
The BLS adjustments for the composition of capital are based on the Jorgenson framework, which reweights components of the capital stock by the user cost of capital. Components with short lifetimes and correspondingly rapid depreciation rates receive higher weights in the composition-adjusted capital input measures ("J") than in capital stock measures ( "K" ). Over the postwar period there has been a continuous substitution of equipment for structures and of short-lived equipment like computers for long-lived equipment like furniture. The BLS, which aggregates across categories of capital (equipment, structures, residential rental capital, and inventories), attributes a major composition change to the increased quantity of J-weighted capital relative to the K-stock, and the growth rate of this composition effect is recorded in column (iii) of Table 3 . Sufficient data to extend the BLS technique backward exist only to 1925, and as yet there is no parallel composition-adjustment seties available. In my research I have adopted the Pending further research on price measurement errors, my basic explanation is perhaps the most obvious but also the most neglected. I believe that the inventions of the late 19th century and early 20th century were more fundamental creators of productivity than the electronic/internet era of today. I classify those earlier inventions into four clusters, starting with electricity (including electric motors, the electric light, and consumer appliances), internal-combustion engines (motor transport, air transport, superhighways, supermarkets, and suburbs), "rearranging molecules" (petrochemicals, plastics, and pharmaceuticals), and communications/entertainment (telephone, radio, movies, and television).2
The "big four" were much more profound creators of productivity growth than anything that has happened recently. Much of what we are seeing now is "second order," for example the VCR which combines TV and movies but does not have the fundamental impact of the invention of either, and much of the use of the internet which substitutes one form of entertainment for another. Enthusiasts of the internet might consider that the computer has not created the paperless society, but rather a duplication of electronic activities, all of which generate paper, including the increasing pressure on academic societies to produce alternative paper and electronic versions of their journals and membership lists.
Puzzles in the evolution of long-run economic growth are the ties that bind economic historians, macroeconomists, and microeconomic experts on hedonic price equations and product composition. Yet the more research that emerges on specific questions, the less is learned about the underlying structure of the "big wave." The exercises summarized in this paper place more of the peak of MFP growth during 1950-1972 and less during 1913-1950; yet the underlying question remains intact: why did the fundamental determinants of American economic growth create such a surge between 1913 and 1972, but neither before nor after? I deeply believe that this was a unique event that will not be replicated in the lifetimes of our generation or that which follows us, and I hope the challenge of proving me wrong stimulates a new era of growth research worthy of the pioneering efforts of Kendrick, Denison, Griliches, and Jorgenson.
